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Abstract 
In the near future the CAP will continue to be structured around two pillars. In the first pillar 
the main instrument for producers’ support is the decoupled Single Farm Payment.  In this 
paper we review the methodological framework for analysing decoupled payments in models of 
agricultural production. Market and technological uncertainty, credit constraints, farm 
household choices involving extra-agricultural decisions, policy uncertainty and long-run 
impact of decoupling on investment and land values are the relevant issues that should be 
pursued by methodological and empirical analysis. Future research should refine the analysis 
of decoupled payments, mainly trying to provide results that can be useful for policy simulation, 
to bridge the gap between analysis at the individual level and sector policy models.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
In the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) jargon, the first pillar represents the set of 
policy instruments having to do with market support of agricultural products and direct 
payments to farmers, as opposed to the second pillar, which has to do with Rural Development 
policies.  
What we now identify as the first pillar has always been the cornerstone of the CAP, 
since its establishment in 1957, when the six founding members of the European Union (EU) 
decided to start managing agricultural market support at the community level. Although the first 
Community rural development policies date back to the 1970s, the second pillar has been 
officially identified in the context of the Agenda 2000 reform, when it was established that the 
CAP should explicitly pursue additional objectives concerning the sustainable development of 
rural areas, mainly based on the idea of agricultural multifunctionality (i.e., the ability of the 
agricultural sector to provide a range of services going beyond the mere production of 
foodstuffs). 
The establishment of the second pillar has had important budgetary consequences for the 
CAP, since, starting with the 2003 Fishler reform, a gradual transfer of financial resources from 
the first to the second pillar was implemented, through the so-called “modulation” mechanism, a 
progressive cuts of direct payments to the largest farms. As a result of this policy, which has 
been reinforced in the 2008 Health Check reform, the budget allocation between the two pillars 
has changed, but the first pillar share, according to the 2010 EU agricultural budget, is still 
around 75% of the total. Thus, the first pillar remains the main source of the CAP spending, and Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 2 of 33 
this is clearly the first strong argument for carrying out an accurate evaluation of its impact on 
farm choices and on the whole agricultural sector of the EU.  
As it is well known, since its establishment, the first pillar of the CAP has gone through a 
number of fundamental changes. When the CAP came into force, in the 1960s, its main tools 
were explicitly targeted to support the EU prices of agricultural commodities, both with 
domestic support tools (primarily the intervention buying system at a given minimum price) and 
with some coherent trade policies (primarily a variable import levy and an export refund). In 
such a system, the cost of the policy was mainly due to export subsidies and public stocks’ 
management, leaving much of the burden of the support on consumers. 
The implementation of the CAP in this form led very quickly to a rapid increase in stocks 
and in the corresponding management costs, including third country disposal through export 
subsidies. As a result, some supply control policy tools, like voluntary land set-aside and 
production quotas for milk and sugar, were introduced. Direct payments to farmers were 
introduced with the 1992 MacSharry reform, as a compensation for strong cuts in the 
intervention prices of many agricultural commodities. Although not directly linked to output, 
the MacSharry direct payments were still considered “partially coupled” to production, since, 
for example, the area payments for arable crops affected marginal production decisions through 
the land allocation mechanism (Sckokai and Anton, 2005)
1. 
But the true “revolution” of the first pillar was certainly represented by the 2003 Fischler 
reform, whose main change was the effective “decoupling” of direct payments. In fact, most of 
the partially coupled payments granted under the various Common Market Organisations were 
converted into a Single Farm Payment (SFP) based on historical entitlements, with no explicit 
link to any type of production decisions, although granted on disposal of ‘eligible land’. The 
only further requirement for obtaining the SFP is the so-called “cross-compliance”, a provision 
that links the payments to farmers’ fulfilment of a set of criteria concerning issues like 
environment, public health, animal welfare.  
The most recent 2008 Health Check reform confirmed and strengthened this trend 
towards market orientation of the CAP. In fact, the intervention mechanisms have been strongly 
limited, all payments still coupled to production have been decoupled and moved into the SFP 
scheme, with very few exceptions, and one of the most distorting policy tools of the old CAP, 
milk quotas, will be phased out by 2015.  
This wave of reforms has modified the nature of the first pillar and its composition in 
terms of policy tools. Based on the OECD figures, the Producer Support Equivalent (PSE) of 
EU farmers has radically changed (Figure 1): while in the 1980’s market support measures 
accounted for around 90% of the PSE, in 2007-09 their share has decreased to around 27%. The 
                                                      
 
 
1 The 1992 reform paved also the way for the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in the context of the 
trade negotiations of the WTO. As a result of that agreement, the first pillar trade policy changed quite substantially, 
since, for example, variable levies were converted into tariffs and strong limits were introduced on the use of export 
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remaining 73% is all made of direct payments, in which the SFP takes the largest share (almost 
40% of the total PSE). In terms of  pure budget expenditure, in 2010 the decoupled payments 
have accounted for around 57% of the total EU agricultural budget. 
 
Figure 1:Three-year average PSE in the European Union – 1986-2009. 



































   Source: our elaboration on OECD data 
 
This trend is likely to continue in the near future. In fact, in November 2010 the 
Commission presented its proposals for the future of the CAP after 2013, when the new EU 
budget period will start (European Commission, 2010). While the document remains still open 
in terms of possible reform strategies (three rather different options are offered to the public 
debate at the end of the document), some elements are already clear. The CAP after 2013 is 
likely to maintain the structure around two pillars, the first containing the support paid to all 
farmers on a yearly basis and the second containing the support tools for rural development, 
managed by the Member States on a multi-annual programming basis.  
In the future first pillar, a central role will again be played by the decoupled direct 
payments, although their concrete application may be redesigned, based on some criteria 
mentioned in the document. One of the issue to be discussed is a possible redistribution of the 
payments across farmers, as well as the introduction of an upper ceiling for large farms. 
Although a portion of the decoupled payments will continue to be provided conditional on 
cross-compliance only, the Commission proposes that a significant portion of these payments 
should be provided on the basis of stronger environmentally oriented agricultural activities. 
Coupled payments will be maintained only for very limited and justified cases, while a 
simplified payment scheme for small farmers is likely to be implemented. Market measures will 
be maintained as a safety-net tool, to be implemented only under specific market conditions, 
while an increasing attention will be dedicated to the functioning of the food supply chain, since 
the share of the value added accruing to the agricultural sector is decreasing over time. Although Ancona - 122
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no specific policy tool has been indicated, the Commission emphasises the potential disrupting 
role of the imbalance of bargaining power along the chain, the level of competition at each stage 
of the chain, the contractual relations and the transparency of food pricing. 
In our opinion, this brief review of the evolution of the first pillar, and of its potential 
future developments, makes clear the central role of decoupled payments as main policy tool of 
the present and future CAP. This means that, for the agricultural economics profession, the main 
area of research concerning the first pillar is certainly to investigate the impact of decoupled 
payments on farm choices. Thus, the objective of this paper is to review the literature that has 
already addressed this issue, in order to identify the most relevant research challenges, both in 
terms of conceptual approaches and in terms of empirical implications. Before getting into the 
more technical details, in the next section we start reviewing the main general issues that have 
characterised the scientific and political debate around decoupled payments. 
2.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AT STAKE 
Since their introduction as concrete agricultural policy tools, with the 1996 FAIR Act in 
the US and with the 2003 CAP reform in the EU, the central research issue concerning 
decoupled payments has always been whether or not they have an impact on farm output. This 
is clearly the most natural research question, since the whole idea of decoupling is the use of 
support tools that have no market distorting effects, in the sense that they do not affect relative 
prices of agricultural commodities or of the inputs used to produce them. Moreover, it is also a 
hot political question, since both the EU and the US policy makers tend to consider their 
payments as “green-box” payment, which in the current World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
discipline implies an exemption from any domestic support reduction commitment. 
The difficulties in addressing this fundamental issue are clearly shown buy the first wave 
of studies trying to evaluate the impact of decoupling. Since the announcement of the 
introduction of the SFP (which became operational in 2005), all large partial and general 
equilibrium models routinely used for policy analysis have been adapted for simulating the 
impact of the “decupling” scenario in EU agriculture, as opposed to a counterfactual scenario of 
continuation of the previous “partially coupled” policies. A review of these studies is available 
in Balkhausen et al. (2008) and Gohin (2006), where it is clear that simulation results are rather 
sensitive to the hypotheses made by the modellers on the “degree of decoupling” of the new 
SFP, and also that these hypotheses are essentially represented by an arbitrary (implicit or 
explicit) “coupling factor” attached to the SFP. These two review studies show how model 
assumptions concerning specific aspects of the CAP, like the degree of decoupling of the 
MacSharry type “partially decoupled” payments and the linkage between livestock and 
crop/fodder productions, may significantly affect simulation results. 
The fact that most simulation models are forced to use an arbitrary coupling factor is 
clearly a signal of the complexities involved in modelling explicitly the potential output effect 
of decoupled payments. The conceptual paper written by the OECD (2001) already analyses 
some of the possible mechanisms that may generate output and trade effects of decoupled Ancona - 122
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payments. Two categories of these mechanisms are analysed in detail in that paper: the risk 
related effects and the dynamic effects. The first ones occur because, if farmers are risk averse, 
any measure affecting the absolute level of farmers’ income and its variability may affect 
production decisions, while the second ones occur because investment decisions affect both 
current and future production, or because farmers develop expectations concerning future 
policies. However, decoupled payments may affect other key variables concerning the farm 
decision-making behaviour. For example, if one assumes that the household production and 
consumption decisions are not separable, any change in income may affect labour/leisure 
choices, thus affecting on-farm and off-farm labour allocation. Again, if one assumes imperfect 
credit markets, the availability of a flow of decoupled payments may allow farmers to relax their 
credit constraints, obtaining, for example, better conditions for their long-term loans or better 
access to credit for variable input purchasing. Moreover, since the SFP, as well as the 
corresponding US payments, are still linked to land, the land rental market may be affected by 
the presence of the payments. Finally, the income support deriving from the decoupled 
payments may affect a crucial decision like entry and exit from the sector, especially if the 
provision of the payments is somehow linked to the continuation of some agricultural activity.  
These possible linkages between decoupled payments and farm choices have been the 
subject of a relevant flow of empirical literature in recent years, which is reviewed in detail in 
the next sections. A common element to most of these papers is that they rely almost 
exclusively on case studies analysed on farm level data. This is an important signal that 
researchers are aware that the problems related to the potential impact of decoupled payments 
has to do with the individual response of farmers to market and policy incentives and that 
restrictions placed on aggregate model of production choices are very stringent. Of course, the 
use of individual data poses the problem of aggregating individual response at the sector level, 
so to provide usable information for policy simulation models. 
EU policy and research officials seem also aware of this crucial aspect of the new CAP. If 
one reviews the calls for proposals launched in recent years by the European Commission in the 
context of the Framework Programmes (FP) for Research and Technological Development, 
there are important changes in the topics concerning the analysis of the first pillar of the CAP 
(European Commission, 2006 and 2011). In FP6 (2002-06) there was a rather strong emphasis 
on financing modelling efforts for policy analysis concerning either the whole EU agriculture 
(the AGMEMOD project is certainly the most remarkable effort in this area) or some relevant 
sectors of the EU agricultural economy (EDIM for dairy and WEMAC for arable crops are 
examples of this type); to our knowledge, only one call was specifically dedicated to the impact 
of decoupling, in rather general terms (the IDEMA project). In FP7 (2007-10), the topics related 
to the impact of the CAP have to do with much more detailed aspects, like the functioning of 
factor markets as capital, land and labour (the FACTOR MARKETS project) or with the 
modelling of CAP tools using the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data (the FACEPA 
and the FADNTOOL projects). It should also be noted that, in the 2010 call, one topic was 
specifically addressed to the “transparency” of food pricing and the functioning of the food Ancona - 122
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supply chain (the TRANSFOP project). In our opinion, this change in focus of the FP7 calls, 
that is likely to be inspired also by the DG-AGRI officials, clearly shows their awareness that 
the individual farm responses to the CAP tools are the key elements to analyse the impact of 
decoupled payments on the EU agricultural sector. In addition, EU officials seems aware of the 
central role of the functioning of the food chain for determining the share of the value added 
accruing to agriculture. 
Another common element of the studies on decoupling is that they often analyse specific 
details of how such payments are designed. This is another key issue: the same type of 
decoupled payments may have a totally different impact on farm choices depending on details 
like eligibility criteria, timing, transferability and so on. Thus, a very important research task is 
to analyse the effects of such details. 
Finally, another common feature of these studies is that most of them (at least those 
referring to the EU policy) are based on data preceding the introduction of the SFP. Thus, they 
typically run simulations on the impact of decoupling using data/parameters referring to a 
totally different policy environment. For this reason, their conclusion should be taken with some 
caution, and a new wave of studies should be undertaken using also farm data referring to the 
post-2005 period, which are now becoming available for a reasonable time span. 
The following review of the literature follows the development of a stylised behavioural 
model, taking into account the impact of decoupled payments on farm choices. 
3.  A STYLISED MODEL OF DECOUPLING  
As a general behavioural model for analysing individual decisions in agricultural 
production, we assume that household utility is obtained by income/consumption expenditure 
and leisure  ( ) , Uc r, where leisure r  is given by the total amount of allocable time  T L  less the 
time allocated to labour l , that is  T rL l = − ; for a farm household, income/consumption 
expenditure  c  may coincide with farm’s profits π pq wx G = −+ , given technology 
( ) ,,, qxzl T ∈ , where q  are outputs,  x are variable inputs,  p  and w are output and input 
prices, respectively,  z  are fixed and/or quasi-fixed inputs, T  is the  technology and G  stands 
for a generic form of government support, accounting for the CAP first
 pillar policy instruments. 
Of course, this model can be extended to account for other sources of income, off-farm labor 
allocation and also inter-temporal choices (consumption/savings, investment). 
This general model may be adapted/simplified to allow for agricultural policy analysis. In 
this context, can be considered as components of the G  term. 
3.1 The static model with no uncertainty 
We start with the very simple analysis of production choices in a static environment, with 
production characterized by the existence of some fixed and/or quasi-fixed factors, and output 
decisions only involving the choice on variable inputs. The short-run time horizon prevents such Ancona - 122
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models from providing an explanation about decisions on farm’s investments (land, machinery, 
building). Choices are modelled in the context of a competitive environment with profit-
maximizing price-taker farmers. 
Profit maximization has been taken for a long time as the reference framework for 
analyzing farmer’s behaviour and the impact of policy instruments, typically concentrating on 
choices with no uncertainty. In this case the farmer’s problem may be written as: 
()
max
.. , , ,
x
π pq wx G




Under this simple formulation, with farmer’s labor taken as a quasi-fixed factor, a 
standard result is that agricultural policy instruments may affect farm’s output only if their 
amount is coupled to production choices , that is if  ( ) GG x = . Considering for simplicity a 
single-output technology with production function  ( ) ,, qq x z l = , then the FOC’s for this 
maximization problem are: 









and thus coupled agricultural policy support may influence production decisions at the margin
2. 
On the contrary, in this context, decoupled instruments do not have any impact on farmer’s 
choices: in fact, lump sum payments exhibit  0 i Gx ∂ ∂=.  
3.2 The static model under risk neutrality 
Agricultural production is largely characterized for being a risky business; market risk 
(i.e. price risk) and technological risk (i.e. output risk) are distinctive features of agricultural 
production, and production theory and empirical analysis have devoted a large effort to  account 
for uncertainty. In the context of profit maximization, uncertainty is treated in a simplified way. 
However, if we assume risk neutrality, we may take farmers as maximizing expected profits, 
and this assumption does not complicate the analysis. For example, consider the simple case of 
output price risk only, with a given price distribution  ( )
2 , ~ p pp σ ; then the farmer’s 
maximization problem may be re-formulated as:  
() ( ) ( ) max
x
E π Ep q w x G Epq w x G =− + = − +  
and thus choices are conditional on the expected price, and the only additional issue is that of 
modelling price expectations (naive and adaptive expectations, rational expectations, futures 
                                                      
 
 
2 We first concentrate on the impact of government support on marginal decisions, that is on FOCs for maximizing 
behaviour. However, government support may intervene also on the decision on whether to produce or not (i.e. to exit 
the market); we will discuss this issue later. Ancona - 122
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contracts). Even by adding technological (output) risk,  ( )
2 , ~ q qq σ , then the producer’s problem 
is:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) max cov ,
x
E π Ep q w x G Ep q w x EG EpEq p q w x EG = −+= −+ = + −+  
that under the common (although not fully reasonable) assumption that  () cov , 0 pq =  will just 
maintain the complexity of the model with no uncertainty. For example, representing the 
technological risk with the following stochastic technology (Just and Pope, 1978)
3: 
( ) ,, (,,) qq x z l h x z l ε =+  
where  ε  is a stochastic term with zero mean and unit variance, i.e.,  ( ) 0,1 ~ ε , thus giving  the 
following distribution for output,  () () ( )
2
,, , ,, ~ q qxzl hxzl ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ; then the risk neutral producer’s 
problem will reduce to:  
   () ()( ) ( ) max , ,
x
E π Epqx z l w x EG =− +  
that is, to maximize expected profits simply based on the expected price and the expected 
(planned) output. As we said, the profit maximizing framework under certainty and/or risk 
neutrality is suitable to analyze the impact of agricultural policy instruments only if they affect 
decisions at the margin (that is, they impact FOCs, either because  0 i Gx ∂∂ ≠  or 
( ) 0 i EG x ∂∂ ≠ ). 
Empirically, we may proceed to obtain a tractable specification by adopting either the 
primal approach or the dual approach. A system of equations is then derived and estimated 
using available data (time-series data, cross-section data, panel data, unbalanced panel data, 
pseudo-panel data), at different possible levels of aggregation (aggregate or individual data, 
different levels of output and/or input aggregation).  
The primal approach requires to specify a functional form for the production function and 
then to estimate this production function jointly with the FOCs for profit maximization; a 
possible endogeneity issue for inputs arises in the context of the primal approach, but methods 
are available to circumvent the problem at the estimation stage
4.  
The dual approach has been largely employed in agricultural production modelling. 
Under this approach, we may start by specifying a profit function for the farm: 
   ( ) { } ,,, , m a x
x
π pwzlG p q w x G ≡− +  
and then deriving a system of output supply and input demand functions, where exogenous 
variables are prices, fixed and/or quasi-fixed factors, and policy instruments. Empirically, we 
need to start by assuming a (flexible) functional form for the profit function and then derive 
                                                      
 
 
3 This stochastic specification of the production function is largely employed in empirical studies; the stochastic part 
will allow inputs to be risk-increasing or risk decreasing, according to the sign of 
2
i hx ∂ ∂ . 
4 Instrumental variable methods, such as 3SLS, or GMM (see Ooms and Peerlings, 2005) Ancona - 122
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explicit representations for output supply and input demand functions using derivative 
properties. Applications are widely available in literature.  
Under the dual approach, a common practice is also that of analysing production 
decisions resorting to the ‘cost function approach’, by which we proceed to estimate an 
empirical specification of the cost function, defined as: 
   () ( ) { } ,, m i n : ,,,
x
Cqwz w x qxzl T ≡∈  
from which a system of input demand functions can be derived; note that, in principle, output 
price risk does not affect the cost function.  
Even though, with policy instruments linked to output, the derivation of the cost function 
is not affected by the amount of the payments, the cost function approach may still be important 
for the analysis of some specific first pillar tools
5. However, the definition and the estimation of 
the cost function under output uncertainty is not a trivial issue. Following Pope and Just (1996) 
and Chambers and Quiggins (2000) we may represent optimizing behaviour by defining a cost 
function based on expected output,  ( ) ,, Cqwz, called the ‘ex-ante cost function’, whose 
estimation is challenging because expected (ex-ante) output, which is the result of both 
technological characteristics and producer’s expectations or beliefs, is not observable; what we 
in fact observe is actual (ex-post) output. Solutions to the problem and further discussion have 
been proposed by Pope and Just (1996) and Moschini (2001); further developments can be 
found in Chavas (2008) and in Serra et al. (2010) for an extension to the dynamic context.   
With the recent shift from coupled instruments towards decoupled instruments, the above 
framework appears to be not sufficient. As we have seen, fully decoupled instruments do not 
influence marginal decision, and therefore they do not enter the FOCs of the primal 
specification; therefore, also the dual profit function does not account for fully decoupled 
instruments, if support does not depend on production choices. Of course, moving from fully 
coupled instruments (like market price support) to partially decoupled instruments will require 
at least a refinement of the above model specification. For example, take the 1992 MacSharry 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for arable crops, where price support was cut 
and compensated with area payment based on land allocation and consider the (multi-product) 
above specification:  
()
max
.. , , ,
x
π pq wx G











=∑ , for the n products subject to area 
payments, with  k s  being land allocations of the quasi-fixed input land in  z . This only partially 
                                                      
 
 
5 For example, policy simulation models for evaluating the impact of the removal of the milk quota system heavily 
rely on the estimation of marginal costs (see, for example, Moro et al., 2005, Bouamra-Mechemache et al., 2008, and 
Kempen et al., 2010). Ancona - 122
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decoupled payment, that may differ among crops, will affect production choices, since the total 
payment will depend on land allocated between arable crops with area payments and other crops 
without area payments, and further also on the allocation of land within arable crops receiving 
different area payments. Then, in order to measure the effect of these payments we need to 
explicitly modelling the land allocation mechanisms of the quasi-fixed factor land (references 
and examples can be found in Chambers and Just, 1989; Guyomard et al. , 1996; Oude Lansink 
and Peerlings, 1996; Moro and Sckokai, 1999; Serra et al., 2005b).  
But when instruments are more decoupled, as in the case of the SFP, where an 
undifferentiated area payment is provided on ‘eligible land’, normally coinciding with total 
farmland, then the ‘direct’ effect of agricultural support cannot be modelled within the above 
profit maximizing framework. However, economic theory shows that lump-sum payments 
(decoupled support) may in fact impact on farmer’s choices.  
A first route to be explored is the role of (decoupled) payments in relaxing farmers’ credit 
constraints that limit the purchasing of variable inputs: this issue may be of great relevance for 
transition countries in the EU, although credit constraints may affect farms also in developed 
countries









where the presence of the credit constraint C  will prevent the farm to produce the unrestricted 
profit maximizing output; in this context decoupled government payments may relax such 
constraint, that is wx C G ≤ +
7. Empirical evaluation of the impact of government payments on 
the credit constraint would first require a modelling strategy leading to a model that can be 
estimated econometrically. Examples of these models are rather scarce in the literature, and 
further research is certainly needed
8.  
3.3. The static model under risk aversion 
A second route by which decoupled payments may impact on production is by 
considering the role of uncertainty in more depth. Following the seminal work by Sandmo 
(1971) that pointed out how fixed costs have non-neutral effects on firm’s production under 
(price) uncertainty and producer’s risk aversion, then a decoupled payment may alter production 
decisions (for a review of decision-making under uncertainty, see Moschini and Hennessy, 
                                                      
 
 
6 For example, evidence has been found in Blancard et al. (2006) for French farms. Their analysis, based on the 
definition of an expenditure-constrained profit function and the estimation of a nonparametric production technology, 
allows to evaluate credit constraints both in the short-run and in the long-run (i.e. on investment decisions).  
7 An important implication is that derived by Ciaian and Swinnen (2009) for land values/rents: with credit constraints, 
payments based on (eligible) land may increase land rents more than the amount of the payment. 
8 One of the few examples is Kumbhakar and Bokusheva (2009), that have developed a framework for evaluating 
output losses due to the existence of a credit constraint by applying the indirect production function. Goodwin and 
Mishra (2005) using a Tobit model to explain the proportion of direct payment that are used on the farm found that 
their proxy for credit constraint (debt/asset ratio) was significant, concluding that direct payments may in fact affect 
production decision in credit-constrained farms.  Ancona - 122
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2001). Hennessy (1998) provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of income 
support policies under uncertainty, basically identifying two specific effects of policy 
instruments under uncertainty: the wealth effect and the insurance effect
9.  
To generalize the producer’s problem, we may think of a (risk-averse) farmer maximizing 
the expected utility of income (profit) originating from production: 
( ) ( ) max
x
EUπ EU p q w x G ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
where U  is a proper von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function; FOCs are:  






⎡⎤ ∂ ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ∂∂ ⎣⎦ =− + = ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 
First of all, consider that even when the support payment were fully decoupled from 
production choices (i.e.  0 i Gx ∂∂ = ), the level of the payment could impact the FOCs of a non 
risk-neutral producer, if his expected marginal utility depends on the level of profits. For 
example, taking a single output farm with only price risk, a well-known result (Sandmo, 1971; 
Pope and Just, 1991; Hennessy, 1998) is that the wealth effect will increase production choices 
under DARA (Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion). However, other effects may arise under 
uncertainty. Hennessy (1998) introduces the notion of an insurance effect: if decoupled 
payments are dependent on the source of randomness/uncertainty, as it is the case for support 
programs aiming to provide insurance against risk, then a further effect on farmer’s choices can 
be detected. Therefore, a decoupled payment that will provide insurance to farmers (i.e., 
mitigating risk) will increase production (input use)
10. However, the actual direction of the total 
effect of a decoupled payment would be an empirical matter, since it is not always possible to 
sign it only on a theoretical ground, unless we resort to rather restrictive assumptions.   
Again, empirically the issue of uncertainty may be tackled through either a primal or a 
dual approach
11. 
Considering the primal approach, an example may be found in Serra et al. (2006), who 
extend the model by Leathers and Quiggin (1991). Considering for simplicity only one output, 
we have:  
() () 0 max , , ( , , )
x
EUW p qxzl p hxzlε wx G ⎡⎤ ++ − + ⎣⎦  
                                                      
 
 
9 Simulations made in Hennessy (1998) showed that the insurance effect of government programs may provide the 
largest impact on farmers’ decision, even more than the coupling impacts, while wealth effects were in fact very 
small.  
10 Sckokai and Moro (2006 and 2009) have implicitly considered a further possibility, that the decoupled payment G  
may modify the distribution stochastic prices, and thus of farm’s income. For example, the introduction of the SFP, 
accompanied by a reduction in guaranteed prices, modified the distribution of the price variable, thus possibly leading 
to a ‘negative’ insurance effect. It should be noted that their notion of the insurance effect is not the same as that in 
Hennessy (1998). 
11 An ad-hoc alternative would be that of introducing risk preferences in empirical models of production choices by 
means of explanatory proxy variables, as in Sckokai and Anton (2005) and Goodwin and Mishra (2006). Ancona - 122
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where  0 W  is the farmer’s initial wealth, with both market and technological uncertainty. By 
further assuming that production risk and price risk are uncorrelated
12, and assuming that 
expected utility will depend upon the first two moments of the distribution of wealth (mean and 
standard deviation), that is:  
    
( )






WW p q x z l w xG
σσ p hxzl qxzl
=+ −+
⎡ ⎤ =+ + ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 
we will have the following farmer’s optimization problem
13: 
[] ( ) max max , W
xx
EUW VWσ ⎡ ⎤ ≡ ⎣ ⎦  
Flexible functional forms can be specified for the expected utility and the production 
function
14, and then the production function and the FOCs for expected utility maximization can 
be estimated jointly.  
The dual approach under uncertainty has been less exploited in literature. A possible 
route has been proposed by Coyle (1992; 1999), relying on the specification of an indirect 
utility function, obtained from the farmer optimizing the (expected) utility of wealth. Such a 
problem is tackled by specifying a (direct) mean-variance expected utility function:  







VW σ =−  
where  W  and 
2
W σ  are respectively the expected wealth and the variance of wealth, and 
( )
2 , W α W σ  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
15. Also under duality, uncertainty may be 
related to both output and/or price; taking the simple case of a single output farm, with 
                                                      
 
 
12 This assumption is of course questionable; market equilibrium will imply that market risk and technological risk 
are not independent. However, when farm data are used in empirical analysis, as it is common nowadays, this 
assumption may be considered acceptable (Serra et al., 2006) 
13 Note that according to this specification we are considering only the wealth effect of a non-stochastic decoupled 
payment. However in principle the model can be adapted to accommodate different situations and thus allowing also 
for evaluating the insurance effect of decoupled payments. For example consider a very simple case for which the 
payment is taken as a (decreasing) linear function of output price  p , thus not depending on producers’ choices, that 
is GGg p =− , then the problem is: 
  
() ( ) 0 max ( )
x E U W pq x ph x ε wx G gp ⎡⎤ ++ − + − ⎣⎦  
and therefore ( ) o W W pq x wx G gp =+ −+ − and  () () () () () ()
22 22 2 2 2 Wp σσ p h x q x g gq x ⎡ ⎤ =+ + + − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.  
14 As an example, Serra et al. (2006) used the flexible utility 
θβ
W VW σ =−  proposed by Saha (1997), where the sign 
of  β  will determine risk attitude (aversion, neutrality, loving) and the value of θ  the type of risk preferences under 
risk aversion (constant, decreasing or increasing absolute risk aversion, i.e. CARA, DARA or IARA). For the 
production function, it is common to refer to a quadratic specification for  ( ) ,, qxz l and  ()
2
,, hxzl ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . A slightly 
different approach can be found in Koundouri et al. (2009). 
15 The coefficient of absolute risk aversion is defined as  '' ' α UU = − . Note that if α  were independent from 
()
2 , W W σ , then we would have CARA preferences, while DARA preferences would require  0 α W ∂ ∂≤.  Ancona - 122
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uncorrelated price and output risks, then we may have  ( )
2 , ~ p pp σ  and  () ( )
2 ,, , ~ q qxzε q σ , 
where  ε  may account for weather/environmental variability. Then  o WW p qw xG = +−+  and 
22 2 2 2
Wp q σσ q σ p =+, and therefore we may define the (dual) indirect utility  function V  as (see 






,, , , ,, m a x m a x
2
W
p ε op q
xx
α W σ
Vp εσ σ Ww G V W p q w xG σ q σ p
⎧ ⎫ ⎪ ⎪ ⎡⎤ == + − + − + ⎨ ⎬ ⎣⎦
⎪ ⎪ ⎩⎭
 
An application of this procedure to the analysis of the CAP decoupled SFP can be found 
in Sckokai and Moro (2006); they consider only price risk and rely for the empirical analysis on 
the normalized quadratic form to approximate the indirect utility V ; Coyle (1999) provides an 
empirical example on how to use this approach when both price and output risk are considered.  
From an empirical point of view, a relevant issue to be considered is related to the 
modelling of risk perceptions from producers, leading thus to the definition of the form of the 
distribution of the stochastic variables and the computation of the relevant moments (in the 
above case, computing the mean and the variance for the two stochastic variables, price and 
output). This will require to assume some mechanism for the formation of expectations for the 
two stochastic variables. For example, considering stochastic prices, a very simple way is that of 
taking the approach by Chavas and Holt (1990) and Pope and Just (1991) that use adaptive 
expectations for which  ( ) 11 2 tt t t pp p p −− − =+ − ; furthermore, the variance covariance matrix 
can be computed by resorting again  to the method proposed by Chavas and Holt (1990), where 
variances are computed as a weighted sum of squared deviations of past prices from their 





ti t i t j
i
p ω pp −−
=
=− ∑ . A similar route can be followed 
to compute the mean and the variance of output. A second relevant empirical issue is that of 
aggregating outputs and prices; theoretical conditions for aggregating outputs and inputs are 
known (see Just and Pope, 2001 for a review), and also empirically index number theory 
provides methods to aggregate prices (and output). But when we have risk in either prices or 
output then the standard approach must be extended to account for risk, in order to define the 
correct mean and variance for the aggregate index (see Coyle, 2007, and Sckokai and Moro, 
2009, for an application). 
A common feature of the expected utility maximization approach is that of leading to the 
estimation (and testing) of farmers’ risk preferences: evidence of risk aversion has been found in 
most of the empirical analysis on decoupled payments. Serra et al (2008) found that Spanish 
arable crop farmers are risk averse, displaying DARA preferences; the same result was found by 
Serra et al. (2006) using farm data for Kansas. Risk aversion (under constant relative risk 
aversion, CRRA, a class of DARA preferences) was found by Sckokai and Moro (2006) for Ancona - 122
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Italian crop producers, with the degree of risk aversion lowering from small farms to large 
farms; Koundouri et al. (2009) resorting to a different specification of the primal approach
16 
found that in Finland farmers’ risk aversion decreased through time, also following the 
introduction of direct payments, as well as with farm’s size
17.  
The policy relevance of this type of analyses relates to the empirical measure of the 
impact of decoupled payment on production decisions. Despite the empirical evidence of risk 
aversion, the estimated wealth effect implied by risk preferences and decoupled payments is 
low; thus also the estimated impact on production through the wealth effect is low. Serra et al. 
(2006) found that input demand elasticities with respect to decoupled payment were not 
statistically significant; in Sckokai and Moro (2006) estimated ‘wealth elasticities’ were quite 
high, but the simulated wealth effect of the introduction of the SFP was small compared to the 
‘insurance effect’ and to the total effect on production and land allocation
18. 
The above studies model decoupled support as increasing final wealth in each period, by 
simply adding (annual) payments to initial wealth; as a results, the actual percentage change in 
wealth due to decoupled payments is low
19. Of course, such results can be used also to evaluate 
the effect of placing limits on payments (‘capping the CAP’), as in the case of modulation for 
the SFP
20. However, it is important to recognize the role of decoupled payments on land values, 
since for a landowner land may represent a consistent share of initial wealth
21; within the 
context of expected utility maximization (under CRRA), Femenia et al. (2010) show that a 
decoupled payment will impact on initial wealth through its capitalization in the value of owned 
land and that the production (wealth effect) is then larger.  
Results from such models have important normative implications. As we said, empirical 
models provide information on the type of risk preferences, also allowing for testing different 
hypothesis; results from this study may be used to ‘improve’ actual policy instruments, aiming 
to augment farmers’ welfare. In his 2008 AAEA Presidential Address, Professor Richard Just 
(Just, 2008) has deeply questioned the relevance of the above empirical approach to study an 
uncertain world, since the most common specifications would prevent to identify preferences 
(i.e. attitude towards risk) and perceptions (i.e. agent’s subjective probabilities).  
                                                      
 
 
16 In Koundouri et al. (2009), farmers’ risk preferences are not modelled taking an explicit representation of the utility 
function (as the flexible utility function in Saha, 1997), but a risk preference function is used to model the FOC’s 
term given by  ( ) ( ) '' EUε EU . This approach would be flexible enough to accommodate different types of risk 
aversion preferences. Furthermore, under their specification, risk preferences may vary over time. 
17 A further feature of the analysis in Koundouri et al. (2009) is the identification of the so-called ‘downside risk 
aversion’, that measures the attitude towards the skewness in the distribution of profits; findings are that farmers in 
Finland moved towards more willingness to accept the risk of disastrous effects.  
18 The same evidence was obtained in a multi-period extension of their model (Sckokai and Moro, 2009). 
19 In a recent paper (Just, 2009) it has been questioned that empirical studies aiming at evaluating wealth effects for 
decoupled payments in production decisions may have some relevance: in fact ‘the size of wealth transfer necessary 
to induce substantial changes in risk aversion … must be extremely large to make a substantial difference’ (Just, 
2009). 
20 For an example, see the analysis by Goodwin (2009) for the USA.  
21 Usually individual farm data do not allow to have exhaustive information on farm household’s wealth, which is 
then approximated using the value of owned farm assets.  Ancona - 122
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In agricultural production analysis, we may define profits as in the profit function 
( ) , π x ν , where the stochastic variable ν  represents any source of uncertainty, due to market 
and/or technological conditions, with density  ( ) f v . Given that farmers will base their decision 
on maximizing the expected value of a proper  ( ) , U π x ν ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦, then farmers’ behaviour will derive 
from  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) max , max ,
xx
U π x ν f ν dv U x ν f ν dv ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ ∫∫ . However, the same behaviour (i.e. the 
same revealed preference data) can be consistent with alternative specifications of risk attitudes 
and probability density, such as any pair  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, Ux ν Ux ν fv fv ≡    and  () f v  , so that 
() ( ) max ,
x
Ux ν f ν dv ∫
   will lead to the same behaviour (Proposition 1 in Just, 2008; see also Just 
and Just, 2009). Thus, the empirically estimated behavioural equation systems will not allow for 
full identification, that is ‘the estimation of behavioural equations cannot distinguish curvature 
in a utility function from a redistribution of … risk’ (Just and Just, 2009)
22. This means that the 
specification of the utility function U  and of the risk perceptions, (i.e. the form of the 
distribution of random variables), inducing the distribution of profits, is purely arbitrary, and 
one choice will constrain the other. Further, in the function  ( ) , Ux ν  curvature in the utility 
function  U  (i.e. risk preferences) and curvature of the profit function π  (production 
technology) may substitute for each other. 
The discouraging consequence is that estimation of risk preferences may just be a vain 
exercise since it will require the identification of both the risk structure and the production 
structure. Therefore, if risk preferences cannot be identified, then any normative conclusion 
based on such models may be biased and misleading
23, leaving to such models only a positive 
value, although still relevant
24. However such conclusions should not stop researchers to put 
additional effort in the empirical analysis of uncertainty in production. One proposed solution is 
that of estimating additional relationships (i.e. technological relationships and relationships 
identifying price and production risks) together with behavioural (FOC) equations
25; 
alternatively, we may supplement observed data with elicitation and/or experimental methods
26; 
recent development using the state-contingent approach also allow to analyse at least production 
risk in models of production decisions without resorting to an expected utility specification 
(Chavas, 2008).  
                                                      
 
 
22 As we have seen above, farmers’ perceptions are usually modelled in an ad-hoc manner, using simplifying 
assumption on the way individuals form their (subjective) perception of risk. 
23 A similar conclusion can be found in Lence (2009): using simulated data, he showed that ‘… allowing for a 
flexible-utility specification yields risk preference estimates that bear no resemblance to the true parameters’ (Lence, 
2009).  
24 Further discussion on the appropriateness of the Expected Utility paradigm in applied analysis and proposals of 
calibration methods to assess the use of such paradigm can be found in Just (2009) and Just and Peterson (2010).  
25 An interesting route may be that of integrating economic analysis with technological principles, as in Zhengfei et 
al. (2006).  
26 An example of an experiment on production decisions under uncertainty and government payments can be found in 
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3.4 Further issues in static models 
Risk attitudes and market and/or technological uncertainty are not the only way by which 
decoupled instruments may influence production choices in a static environment. For example, 
(decoupled) support may impact the decision of exiting the market (see Chau and de Gorter, 
2005 and de Gorter et al., 2008): therefore, at the sector level, although marginal decisions are 
not affected, the infra-marginal decision of staying in the market will produce ‘distortion’ in the 
quantity supplied, with a possible relevant impact on trade volumes, and thus on the notion of 
decoupling in trade negotiations and dispute settlements. The problem is relevant if sector-
specific payments are granted for a limited amount of output
27, but it may be important also for 
the SFP.  
To understand this issue, consider the above simple single-output profit maximizing firm 
that  ( ) max
x
π pq C q =− ; the (short-run) decision on whether the farm will produce, at the 
optimal level  * 0 q > , or  will not produce and exit the market depends on the relation between 
output price and average variable costs, that is,  * 0 q =  if   ( )
** p Cq q < . In this simple 
framework, a decoupled support G  does not influence decisions at the margin, but if it is linked 
to the agricultural activity (as it is the case of the SFP, which is granted to farmers being active 
on eligible land), then we have that the firm will exit the sector if  ( )
** * p Cq q Gq ⎡ ⎤ <− ⎣ ⎦. 
Therefore, even in this simple framework, the (decoupled) support will impact on the farmer’s 
decision to stay in business; the result is output distortion at the sector level and possible 
inefficiency due to the persistence of infra-marginal firms, affecting the process of sector re-
structuring
28. This of course recognizes the nature of existing decoupled payments in the CAP 
first pillar that are in fact linked to agricultural activity. One justification for such provision is 
that policy makers aim to provide income support to actual farmers; another justification is that 
payments might be taken as rewarding the multifunctional role of agricultural production 
(although this may overlap with measures that are traditionally included in the second pillar). In 
such a situation, however, the crucial point is the impact of decoupled payments on land values 
                                                      
 
 
27 In fact, de Gorter et al. (2008) analyse the issue of cross-subsidization, for which farmers receive a sector-specific 
support on a limited amount of output. The empirical example refer to the Milk Income Loss Contract in the United 
States, where milk farmers are granted a support on a limited production eligible for the payment when domestic 
prices are low. 
28 Key and Roberts (2006) have found a positive significant impact of direct payments on the survival of farm 
business; thus large farms receiving higher payments may in fact benefit further by decoupling, at the expenses of 
small farms exiting the sector. Further indirect evidence can be found in Roberts and Key (2008) who evaluated the 
impact of government payments on land concentration, using zip-code census data; over the time span 1987-1982 
they found evidence that government payments did in fact favour land concentration (a proxy for ‘exit the sector’), 
but for the sub-period 1997-2002, when decoupled payment started to be enforced, the rate of land concentration was 
lower than before. Ancona - 122
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(which is discussed in detail below); of course, if decoupled payment are capitalised in land 
values/rent, than support to actual farmers will depend upon the share of land they own
29.  
Since the SFP, as well as the US decoupled payments, are linked to land, one of the key 
policy issues that is often advocated is the potential capitalisation of such payments in land 
rents/values. The extent to which this capitalisation occurs is relevant for policy in two aspects: 
for the distribution of payment benefits between landowners and farmers (as it is well known, a 
relevant share of agricultural land is rented both in the EU and in the US) and as a signal of the 
extent of the production response to such payments
30. An excellent review of this literature is 
available in Latruffe and Le Mouel (2009), who review both the theoretical and the empirical 
studies. The theory clearly says that the key factors affecting the extent of the capitalisation of 
both output subsidies and area payments in land rents is the price elasticity of land and non-land 
inputs as well as the degree of substitutability between these two categories of inputs
31.   
A structural model of the impact of government payments on land pricing is provided in 
the studies by Roberts et al. (2003) and Lence and Mishra (2003). Starting again from the multi-
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where  r  is land rent, s  is total rented land and farmers are supposed to choose land allocation 
among different crops and the level of non-land inputs, government support G  may include 
(coupled) output subsidies and/or (partially coupled) crop-specific area payments and/or  a 
(decoupled) payment linked to total land. The FOCs of the above representative farmer, in a 
given geographical area where total agricultural area is fixed at S , yield the equilibrium value 
of land rent r , whose main determinants are crop revenues and the different categories of 
government payments. Thus, one can run a simple regression of cash rents against these 
variables, as well as other variables capturing farm heterogeneity, in order to obtain the degree 
of capitalisation of government payments However, these regressions normally carry serious 
identification problems, such that an appropriate estimation technique must be adopted, 
typically involving instrumental variables.  
A common result of these studies, as well as of other studies adopting different 
approaches
32, is that the degree of capitalisation of (yearly) government payments in (yearly) 
                                                      
 
 
29 Further empirical analysis on the impact of decoupled payments on farmers’ exit decisions should be based on the 
estimation of farms’ (marginal) cost; the cost function approach may then be useful. 
30 A high incidence of government payments on land rents may reflect a low production response to support 
programs, with a larger share of payments accruing to land owners, while a low incidence may imply the opposite, 
since payments are dissipated in higher output prices and higher non-land input prices, thus accruing to commodity 
and input producers (Roberts et al., 2003). 
31 See the graphical analysis in Latruffe and Le Mouel (2009) for details. 
32 These approaches are based either on extensions of the traditional Present Value Model, in which researchers try to 
distinguish between the contribution of crop returns and of government payment returns  (Goodwin et al., 2003; 
Shaik et al., 2005, Latruffe et al., 2008), or on some reduced form regressions that try to link together the Ancona - 122
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land cash rents is less than 100%, and typically higher for more decoupled payments (from 80 to 
90%) than for output-based payments (35-45%). Most authors explain the departure from the 
theoretical 100% capitalisation rate of decoupled payments with the requirements that farmers 
have to fulfil for obtaining them (i.e. set-aside, cross-compliance, ....)
33. However, one of the 
striking features of this literature is that almost no studies refer to the EU, especially after the 
introduction of the SFP; notable exceptions are Patton et al. (2008) for Northern Ireland and 
Latruffe et al. (2008) for Czech Republic, but their data refer to the pre-SFP period. Since 
national legislations and local conditions are extremely important for land markets, and the 
issue of capitalisation remains a crucial policy problem, this is certainly an area where further 
research is needed.  
Policy instruments may also impact production decisions if we take as a reference the 
farm household production model (Sen, 1966), with farm household welfare depending on 
consumption  c  and labour allocation, given leisure r . Refining our profit maximizing model 















where  F l  is on-farm labor allocation. We may take a simple (additive) formulation for the 
household utility function, that is  ( ) ( ) ( ) , Uc r uc vr =+, and derive the FOC for optimization, 
assuming an interior solution: 
   0 cl r u π v − =  
From this result, it is clear that decoupled income support G  may impact production 
decision by substituting for labour allocation, that is  0 F dl dG <
35; thus, since output is 
increasing in labour, we have that decoupled payments will reduce production.  
If we then consider that the (unitary) farm household may allocate labour either on-farm, 
F l , or off-farm,  O l , at the wage  O w , then the above problem becomes: 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
contributions of the various theoretical models (Devadoss et al., 2007; Patton et al., 2008), or, more recently, on 
cointegration techniques, examining the relationship between net farm returns and land prices (Mishra et al., 2008). 
Lagerkvist (2005) also proposes a dynamic model of farmland investments, which is discussed in the next section. 
33 Other possible explanations are related to the imperfections in the land market, like transaction costs and imperfect 
competition See for example the analysis by Ciaian and Swinnen (2006) on the new EU member states. 
34 Assuming a unitary farm household is of course a simplification. Note that in this formulation consumption is taken 
as given by farm’s profits, conditional on on-farm labour allocation and decoupled payments. Also, in the discussion 
we do not account for uncertainty, but of course risk and uncertainty may be introduced in such models. 
35 By totally differentiating the FOC we get that 
2 0 Fc c l c c l c l l r dl dG u π u π u π v ⎡⎤ = −+ + < ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ , given the usual 
assumptions on the curvature of the profit function and the utility function; thus a decoupled payment will reduce the 
on-farm labour intensity of production. Ancona - 122
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A standard result from comparative statics is that decoupled payments G  will not impact 
production decisions, since all adjustment is borne by off-farm labour
36; of course such result 
will imply the complete functioning of the labour market. In a recent paper (Key and Roberts, 
2009) it has been argued that farmers may obtain additional non-pecuniary benefits from on-
farm labor: therefore on-farm labor enters directly farmer’s utility 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, FF Uc r l uc vr bl =++ . Two main results are obtained from this simple additive 
model
37; first,   0 F dl dG >  and  0 O dl dG < , which means that farmers will substitute on-farm 
labor for off-farm labor with a decoupled payment; second, in equilibrium ( ) 0 Ol w π −> , that is 
the market wage for off-farm labor is greater than the marginal profit for labour (i.e. its shadow-
price). Thus farmers are willing to accept a lower remuneration for their on-farm labour given 
that non-pecuniary benefits are associated with it. A further striking implication of this result is 
that the empirical observation that agricultural income is lower than income in other sectors may 
be explained, at least partially, by this attitude. Thus, payments granted to farmers as a form of 
compensation for multifunctional activities and for lower average income may not be fully 
justified
38.  
3.5 The dynamic model 
As discussed in the introductory sections, a natural extension of the static model is a multi-
period dynamic model of farmers’ decision making. The relevance of modelling decoupled 
payments in a dynamic framework is clearly the ability of analysing long term farmers’ 
decisions, like investments in land and/or in other capital goods. The potential linkage between 
decoupled payments and farm investments has been typically related to imperfect capital 
markets, which means, for example, gaps between borrowing and lending rates, binding debt 
constraints, high bankruptcy risk and other financial problems. In these cases, even a fully 
decoupled payment may stimulate farm investments, thus affecting farm output
39. 
                                                      
 
 
36 The comparative statics for the problem will give  0 F dl dG = . and  0 O dl dG < . Serra et al. (2005a), Ahearn et al. 
(2006) and El-Osta et al. (2008) found that government payment has a significant negative effect on off-farm labor 
participation. Although in the above simple theoretical model uncertainty is not accounted for, decoupled payments 
may provide an effect on off-farm participation by reducing the risk (i.e. variability) of farm income.  
37 Key and Roberts (2009) stress the fact that such unambiguous results are conditional on additive separability 
assumption of the farmer’s utility function. 
38 In terms of econometric methodology, most of these labour supply models are estimated through discrete choice 
models and/or sample selection techniques (estimated in one or two stages). A recent example, again referring to the 
impact of US decoupled payments, can be found in El-Osta et al. (2008).  
39 In a recent theoretical paper, Vercammen (2007) shows that a decoupled payment may relax the risk of bankruptcy 
and that the consequent investment response by farmers may be stronger for middle-sized farms, the category in 
which the majority of EU farms is likely to fall. Ancona - 122
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A dual model of dynamic farm decision making, incorporating also farmers’ risk attitude, 
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where v is time, t is the starting time of the planning horizon, K  is a vector of quasi-fixed 
inputs, for which farmers are assumed to make investment decisions, I  is a vector of gross 
investment in quasi-fixed inputs, z  is a vector of fixed inputs, for which investment is not 
possible, and  ( ) J ⋅  is the discounted flow of expected utility of wealth. The corresponding 
indirect expected utility function is similar to the previous one, except that now the technology 
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The above dynamic maximisation problem can be solved differentiating the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Belmann dynamic programming equation corresponding to the function  ( ) J ⋅ , since this 
provides a set of output supply, input demand and investment demand equations that can be 
estimated simultaneously
41. An example of this approach, considering price uncertainty only, 
can be found in Sckokai and Moro (2009), where they estimate this model on a sample of Italian 
arable crop farms and then simulate the potential impact of a change in coupled support tools 
(the intervention price), partially coupled tools (the MacSharry type area payments) and 
decoupled tools (the SFP). A reduced form of this same model is estimated by Serra et al. 
(2009) on a sample of Kansas farms, where the lower complexity of the estimated equations 
allow the authors to adopt more realistic assumptions in terms of investment farm behaviour, 
which imply more sophisticated estimation techniques. In fact, Serra et al. (2009) distinguish 
between three regimes of investment behaviour (investment, disinvestment and no investment) 
with different adjustment cost functions, while Sckokai and Moro (2009) assume, in line with 
the previous literature, a strictly convex adjustment cost function, with smooth adjustment of the 
level of quasi-fixed inputs, which is clearly less realistic
42.  
                                                       
 
 
40 Continuous time is the standard assumption in these models, since it allows full differentiability when deriving the 
following dynamic programming equation. However, simpler models may be adopted in a discrete time framework. 
For example, Feinerman and Peerlings (2005) propose a two-period model of farmland demand under uncertainty in 
land availability, which is estimated on a sample of Dutch dairy farms. The interest of their model is the evaluation of 
the “Option Value” of postponing investment when uncertainty is resolved, as predicted by the well known Option 
Theory (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Although they do not explicitly consider the impact of direct payments, their 
model should be easily extendable to account for them.   
41 See Sckokai and Moro (2009) for details. 
42 An alternative methodology for analysing the investment reluctance phenomenon (i.e. the sub-optimal investment 
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Results concerning the impact of decoupled payments on investment cannot be 
considered conclusive. Sckokai and Moro (2009), simulating the impact of the SFP, find a 
rather small impact on investment and, consequently, on arable crop output. On the contrary, in 
Serra et al. (2009), the ex-post investment demand elasticities with respect to decoupled 
payments turn out to be rather strong, especially in the disinvestment regime, when their impact 
can be even stronger then the output price impact. Given these non conclusive evidences, 
additional research efforts in this area are certainly needed.   
A further important problem that can be analysed in a dynamic setting is the issue of 
uncertainty about future policy, in the sense that farmers may develop expectations about the 
future evolution of the payments that may affect their current choices. This problem has been 
analysed by Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) for the US policy, where the level of farm payments 
depends on individual base acreage and yields that, at least in theory, may be updated in the 
following Farm Bill period. Their model is a two-period discrete-time dynamic model (the two 
periods represent two successive Farm Bills) in which their expected utility function is very 
similar to the one presented above, since they assume a representative risk averse farmer (with 
CRRA preferences) facing price and yield uncertainty, with price and yield being negatively 
correlated. They do not estimate the model, but they simply run a simulation after having 
calibrated their model with some parameters taken from a representative maize farm. Their 
results show that acreage may increase by as much as 6.25%, when the farmers’ subjective 
probability that base acreage and yields will be updated reaches its maximum.  
A parallel analysis for the EU case has been carried out by Lagerkvist (2005), although 
with a different objective. In this paper, the author analyses the issue of uncertainty about the 
timing of decoupling of the EU area payments, and he develops a model of optimal farmland 
investment decisions in order to maximise the land value of a representative farmer. In an 
infinite horizon risk-neutral dynamic model, farmland value is defined as the capitalised value 
of the flow of its potential returns, while the decision to invest/disinvest in new farmland 
depends on the comparison between the returns of land and those of alternative investments, 
outside the agricultural sector. The model is used to run a simulation in which the farmers’ 
subjective probability about the timing of decupling and the future level of the payments are 
elicited through a farm survey carried out in Sweden in 2002, when the MacSharry payments 
were still in place. The main result of this study is that farmers facing this type of policy 
uncertainty tend to overinvest in farmland, and, once the uncertainty is resolved, the final value 
of their land turns out to be lower than the optimum. 
In this specific area of dynamic analysis of policies, the available results have only been 
obtained through numerical simulations. However, since the future level of the post-2013 CAP 
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payments is one of the key source of uncertainty for EU farmers, it is certainly valuable to 
develop more research efforts. 
4.  EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
The empirical analysis of the issue of decoupling is rather complex and the literature 
proposes a number of different approaches. However, as it is clear from the previous section, the 
most widespread approach relies on case studies based on the econometric analysis of farm-
level data. This clearly raises a number of issues concerning both the quality of the available 
farm-level databases and the econometric methods that are most suitable for this kind of 
analyses. 
4.1 Farm data and the FADN 
The use of farm data for analysing the impact of decoupling on the agricultural sector 
seems coherent with the general idea that such impact is mainly due to the individual farm 
response to decoupled payments, like the SFP. We think this is also the most suitable starting 
point for deriving results at the aggregate level, or for deriving parameters to be used as input 
for large models that are routinely used for policy analysis, although generalising individual 
results may not always be straightforward.  
As it is well known, the FADN is by far the most widely used farm-level database in the 
EU, since it provides very detailed data on many aspects of the farm business (production 
activities, costs of production, labour use, capital and livestock endowment, land allocation, 
subsidies and CAP payments...) and data are homogeneously collected in all EU member states. 
Moreover, the FADN sample is representative both at the regional and at the sector level (i.e. 
cereals, dairy, beef, fruits and vegetables…) and each farm carries a specific weight 
corresponding to the number of agricultural holdings it represents. This rather unique feature of 
the FADN database is very important, since it allows to design rigorous procedures for 
generalising the sample results to the population level
43. 
Nonetheless, since the FADN database structure is regularly revised by the European 
Commission, a natural question is whether it can be improved in order to better analyse a crucial 
issue for the CAP like the impact of decoupling. In this respect, we think that at least five 
aspects deserve some careful consideration.  
First, since many studies try to answer questions concerning the impact of the SFP on 
input use, data concerning the quantities of variable inputs used on farm would be extremely 
helpful, especially if they have to do with the environmental impact of agriculture. Right now, 
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input use is detailed only for labour, while for most categories of variable inputs (fertilisers, 
pesticides, water, energy, feed...) only total costs are provided, such that researchers are forced 
to derive indirectly input quantities making use of some aggregate input price indices, typically 
taken from national/regional statistics. While for inputs like water and energy quantities should 
be easily recorded, we are aware of the difficulties in measuring quantities for inputs like 
fertilisers, feed or pesticides. However, the technical literature provides some aggregate 
indicators that may be useful in providing a common base for aggregating quantities of different 
commercial products used on farm (i.e. the nutrient content of fertilisers, the energy content of 
feed, …..).   
Second, as long as the SFP is supposed to affect both production and consumption 
choices of the farm household, the availability of more data on household characteristics would 
be also very helpful. For example, some socio-demographic information (i.e., age and education 
of the farm manager, number of household members...), as well as data concerning the 
household off-farm labour and off-farm sources of income/wealth (including savings and share 
holdings), would help in better interpreting the farmers’ choices, especially in models taking 
explicitly into account farmers’ risk aversion. 
Third, since the investment impact is considered a crucial issue for studying the role of 
the SFP, more detailed information on stocks and investments in capital goods would greatly 
help research in this area. For example, it would be helpful to know the type of capital goods for 
which the farmer makes its investments (i.e. a new milking machinery, a new barn, a new 
tomato harvesting machinery, new production or emission rights,…) in order to link more 
precisely investments and farm activities. 
Fourth, as long as the impact of the SFP has to be estimated using dynamic models, in 
which the time dimension becomes relevant, it would also be helpful if farms stay in the FADN 
sample for a longer time period. This would help the identification of unobserved heterogeneity 
among farms, using appropriate panel data models, and would also allow to better analyse a 
crucial policy issue like farm entry and exit. 
Finally, if the results of farm business, and the choices concerning the SFP, are 
increasingly dependent on what happens in the downstream supply chain, some information on 
the relationship between the farm and the downstream firm/markets would be very helpful (i.e. 
if the farm delivers its product to a private processor, to a cooperative or to an intermediate 
agent; which type of processed products are made from the agricultural raw material…) 
To be honest, similar recommendations on possible improvements of the FADN database 
have already been raised in the past (see for example Gardebroek and Oude Lansink, 2008). 
This means that it is also necessary to find an appropriate communication channel between 
researchers and FADN managers, in order to make at least some of these changes operational. 
4.2 Econometric issues 
The structure of most individual farm databases, including the FADN, is that of an 
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exception may be represented by some ad hoc farm surveys, carried out in the context of 
specific research projects: in these cases, the structure of the databases is that of a pure cross-
section. 
Most of the papers reviewed in the previous sections use classical econometric techniques 
to analyse such data. Possible alternatives could be the use of Bayesian estimation as well as of 
Maximum Entropy estimation, since both approaches carry the well known advantage of using 
prior information in the estimation of the parameters of the model (i.e. natural bounds 
concerning supply/demand elasticities, investment rates, risk aversion coefficients...) as well as 
the possibility of deriving individual specific parameters
44. Although they have been often 
invoked as superior alternatives to classical econometrics methods, very few agricultural policy 
studies published in peer reviewed journals have recently used either Bayesian estimation or 
Maximum Entropy estimation
45, and none of them have dealt with the issue of decoupling.   
In the econometric analysis of unbalanced panels of farm-level data, most of the papers 
reviewed in the previous sections have relied on some simplified approach, even though most of 
them required the estimation of complex systems of equations, in which the issue of censoring 
is also extremely relevant (i.e. in most cases, the dependent variable of these equations displays 
many “zeros”, since it is very common that, for example, not every farm produces each crop 
every year). 
The analysis of unbalanced panel datasets is an area of econometrics that has developed 
dramatically in recent years, such that most of these methods have not yet been incorporated as 
automatic commands in the common commercial softwares. In general, econometric panel-data 
techniques relies on the so-called Error Component Model (ECM), of which the well known 
fixed effect and random effect models are the most standard applications. However, when the 
panel is incomplete, standard estimation methods cannot be applied and the ECM must be 
generalized to the unbalanced case (see, e.g., Wansbeek and Kapteyn, 1989; Baltagi et al., 2001; 
Davis, 2002). Furthermore, since the farm-level data-sets often span over several years, the most 
appropriate regression technique is a two-way ECM, in which both time and individual (i.e. 
farm-specific) effects are taken into account (see, e.g., Boumahdi et al., 2004, for a recent 
application). Finally, if one has to estimate a system of equations, these panel data estimation 
techniques must be generalized to the simultaneous estimation of a set of regressions. This 
clearly implies a high level of complexity, since the structure of the error term of the estimated 
equations is heavily affected by the panel structure of the data and by the censoring problem.  
In terms of estimating systems of equations on unbalanced panel data, in a recent paper, 
Platoni et al. (2010) have extended the one-way Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
technique proposed by Biørn (2004) to the two-way case. The same authors (2011) have 
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analysed how arable crop supply and acreage response to policy parameters, estimated on 
FADN data, change as a result of the application of different panel data techniques. Their results 
clearly show that the adoption of different estimation methods implies obtaining quite different 
results, both in terms of absolute value of the estimated parameters and in terms of their 
statistical significance; moreover, the two-way system of equation techniques seem to guarantee 
the most reliable results
46. 
The issue of censoring in systems of equations has also been the subject of relevant 
developments in recent years, especially in the area of demand analysis. Three main approaches 
have been developed. The most rigorous approach implies the evaluation of multiple probability 
integrals (see, among others, Yen et al, 2003, Yen, 2005, and Yen and Lin, 2006) that are likely 
to be unmanageable in many concrete applications with large databases. In these cases, a two-
step approach (see, for example, Shonkwiler and Yen, 1999), although statistically less efficient, 
is likely to be the most viable alternative, since it avoids the computational complexity of the 
previous method. More recently, a new approach based on copulas has been proposed (Yen and 
Lin, 2008), which seems rather promising, since it does not require the normality assumption for 
the error terms and it also avoids the computational difficulties of the multiple probability 
integrals
47.       
To our knowledge, the combined impact of both censoring and unbalanced panel data 
structure on the estimation of large systems of equations has not been fully explored.  
This very brief review of the literature on panel data and censoring clarifies how the 
results obtained in many studies evaluating the impact of decoupling may be sensitive to the 
econometric technique used. A further effort is certainly required by agricultural economists to 
adopt the most appropriate techniques, in order to obtain more robust estimations of the key 
policy parameters.  
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR A RESEARCH AGENDA 
In this paper, we have reviewed the literature concerning the impact of the CAP first 
pillar policy instruments on farm choices, focusing on decoupled payments and econometric 
models. In fact, based on the current structure of the first pillar, where the SFP account for 57% 
of the total EU agricultural budget, and on the perspectives of the post-2013 CAP, sketched in 
the November 2010 Communication of the European Commission, it is clear that decoupled 
payments are going to be the main policy tool of the present and future CAP. 
In general, this literature shows that there are different channels through which decoupled 
payments, like the SFP, may impact farm choices. These channels have been explored through a 
                                                       
 
 
46 An alternative solution to this issue could be that adopted in Whitaker (2009); starting from U.S. data of the 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), a pseudo-panel was created taking means of cohorts of 
observations within each period.  
47 In a recent paper (Tiffin and Arnault, 2010), a new method of addressing the censoring problem has been proposed 
in the context of Bayesian estimation, which avoids the computational complexities of the standard approaches. Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 26 of 33 
number of theoretical and empirical studies, that, in terms of methodology, typically rely on 
case studies based on the econometric analysis of farm level data. This seems coherent with the 
general idea that the impact of decoupled payments is better analysed starting from individual 
farm responses to the (possible) economic incentives created by such payments, since aggregate 
models place too strong restrictions Despite the relevant research efforts of many agricultural 
economists, results of these studies cannot be considered conclusive, especially those related to 
the EU. In fact, while the US has a longer history of implementation of decoupled payments, 
and the corresponding studies are typically based on farm data referring to the period where 
such payments were already in place, most of the empirical studies concerning the EU are 
simulations carried out using parameters estimated on data preceding the 2003 reform. Since 
now new post-2005 farm data are becoming available for a reasonable time span, further 
research efforts are certainly needed in all the topics reviewed in this paper, as well as in areas 
that are virtually unexplored at this stage. 
For example, studies concerning the relationship between decoupled payments and risk 
have already reached some important results: the so-called “wealth effect” is likely to be small, 
while the “insurance effect” may be larger, as long as payments affect farm income volatility. 
Nonetheless, some recent papers have claimed, with rather strong arguments, that the normative 
value of these studies may be rather low, because of their inability to distinguish between 
farmers’ risk preference and perceptions. Thus, a new wave of studies should be carried out, 
following these last indications of the literature and refining the empirical approach. 
Most of the studies concerning the impact of decoupled payments on issues like credit 
constraints, entry/exit decisions, off farm labour allocation and capitalisation in land values refer 
to the US situation, with very few exceptions. Since behind these research questions there are 
some crucial policy issues like farm structural change, farm employment and the true 
beneficiaries of the payments, European agricultural economists should devote some additional 
effort to the empirical analysis of these problems. Moreover, for many of these issues the local 
situations of the different EU member states may generate rather different farm responses to 
decoupled payments, such that obtaining a global picture may imply carrying out a relevant 
number of detailed national studies. 
Finally, studies concerning the dynamic impact of decoupled payments, typically related 
to farm investment behaviour, have reached rather diverging results, such that the size of this 
impact is uncertain. Moreover, a crucial issue like the impact of farmers’ expectations on future 
policies has been addressed only through some simplified numerical simulations. Thus, in the 
whole area of dynamic modelling, further research efforts are certainly needed  
Although the above agenda is already full of topics to be addressed, there are also a 
number of issues that are virtually unexplored at this stage.  
For example, the fact that payments are linked to both land use as well as to other input 
uses (i.e. cross-compliance) should stimulate studies in this area, that have to do also with the 
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of payments in land values are well known, since payment benefits may accrue to land-owners 
only, those linked to other key inputs like water or chemicals may be also very important.  
Another important issue, often invoked in the EU documents, is the distribution of EU 
payments across farms. Since one of the key issue of the post-2013 CAP is a possible 
redistribution of the SFP, this is clearly an area of research that should be considered, perhaps 
linked with the issues that have been identified as potential channels through which decoupled 
payments affect farm choices (i.e. risk, entry/exit, labour use, land values, investment 
decisions). 
Finally, a further crucial area of research, which is strongly emphasised in the recent 
communication of the EU Commission on the post-2013 CCAP, is the impact of policies on the 
functioning of the food supply chain and on the distribution of the valued added along the chain. 
This is a rather neglected area of research by agricultural economist, but it is likely to be crucial 
for the long term prospects of agriculture. In this area, a crucial problem is the imperfectly 
competitive structure of the chain, both at the processing and at the retail level, while most 
modelling efforts concerning agricultural policies assume a perfectly competitive environment. 
The few available evidences in this area indicate that the bias due to this assumption may be 
rather relevant (Soregaroli et al, 2010).  
In addressing such a ponderous research agenda, economists should be aware of two 
general issues. The first relates to the generalisation of results obtained from samples of 
individual farm data to the aggregate sector level. The FADN weighting mechanism provides a 
useful tool for carrying out a rigorous procedure of this type. Thus, this should provide a 
starting point to obtain plausible parameters in aggregate relations for revising the large partial 
and general equilibrium models routinely used for policy analysis, where the impact of 
decoupled payments is typically analysed by means of arbitrary “coupling” factors. The second 
refers to the adoption of the most appropriate estimation techniques. Recent developments in the 
area of the econometric treatment of unbalanced panel data and in the area of censoring should 
be carefully considered, since results are likely to be sensitive to these methodological details. 
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